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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tant fault will be imputed to the manufacturer. Thus, the
majority in Weber, without relying on the Restatement or men-
tioning strict liability, as suggested by plaintiff's attorney8 suc-
cessfully meshes established Louisiana legal principles to protect
an injured consumer by placing the burden of proof and weight
of presumption against the party best able to bear the burden
and produce information. The ultimate value of Weber will be
determined by hindsight alone, but, this writer submits, if the
cause of action is deemed to sound in tort and the case is applied
widely beyond its facts, the potential protection available to
persons injured by defective products is significantly increased.
Jacque B. Pucheu, Jr.
CAPITAL GAINS ON PROCEEDS OF TImBER SALES
Plaintiff's ancestor operated a naval stores business' on his
land. Subsequent to his death, the land was conveyed to a cor-
poration whose sole shareholders were beneficiaries of the estate
and plaintiffs herein. The corporation terminated the naval
stores business and, after determining that the land's future lay
in the production of trees for sale, implemented a program of
site improvement. 2 A county directory listing the corporation
as a buyer and seller of timber was the only advertising under-
taken. In a single transaction the corporation sold all the tim-
ber growing on its land. The corporation later became a Sub-
chapter S corporation, and plaintiffs filed individual income tax
returns, treating their distributive shares of the taxable year's
payment on the sale price as capital gains.4 The Commissioner
of the Internal Revenue Service determined that the proceeds
were taxable as ordinary income. The Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed a jury finding upholding that determination.
Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1971).
The Internal Revenue Code creates a distinction between
37. 259 La. at 628, 250 So.2d at 765.
1. Generally, the term "naval stores" refers to turpentine, tar, pitch,
pine oil, rosin, and other products obtained from the resin of pine and
other cone-bearing trees
2. The trees used in the naval stores business and other inferior trees
were gradually cleared out, young trees planted, new fire-breaks made and
new roads built.
3. INT. Ray. CODS of 1954, § 1371.
4. Id. § 1378.
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ordinary income and long-term capital gains, the significance of
which lies in the tax preference which returns on investment
enjoy.5 Because a long-term capital gain is said to result from
the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for at least six
months,6 favorable tax treatment depends upon what is meant
by the term capital asset. The Internal Revenue Code defines it
in exclusionary terms; certain property, such as that held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of a trade or
business, is not considered a capital asset for tax purposes.7 That
the property is connected with the taxpayer's business, however,
does not by itself affect its status as a capital asset,8 since the
Internal Revenue Code expressly permits favored tax treatment
for dispositions of certain property so connected.9
Whether a particular asset is a capital asset is primarily a
question of fact,10 although it has been treated by some courts
as a mixed question of law and fact.' The courts have developed
several criteria to aid in determining the status of the property,
including: the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring, holding,1 2 and
disposing of the property;1 8 the method of acquiring and the
nature of the property;1 4 the length of time the property was
held by the taxpayer; 5 the number, frequency, and continuity
5. Id. §§ 631(a)-(b), 1201, 1202, 1221, 1231. The tax preference is in the
nature of a lesser rate being applicable to the gain.
6. Id. § 1221(3).
7. Id. § 1221.
8. Id.
9. Id. § 1231 provides for capital gains treatment of gains on sales of
property used In a trade or business to the extent such gains exceed losses
on sales of such property. Property held for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business normally does not fall within this classification.
10. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943); United States v. Burket,
402 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1968); Stockton Harbor Indus. Co. v. Commissioner,
216 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 904 (1955); Reynolds v.
Commissioner, 155 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1946); Real Estate Mort. & Guar. Corp.
v. District of Columbia, 141 F.2d 361 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
11. Reynolds v. Commissioner, 155 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1946); Commis-
sioner v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 619 (1939);
Hollis v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 191 (N.D. Ohio 1954).
12. Shearer v. Smyth, 116 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd mem., 221
F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1955); Malouf v. Riddell, 52-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 45,684 (S.D.
Cal. 1952).
13. Austin v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Tex. 1953); Shearer
v. Smyth, 116 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. Cal. 1953), aff'd mem., 221 F.2d 478 (9th Cir.
1955); Boomhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
14. Smith v. Dunn, 224 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1955); Stockton Harbor Indus.
Co. v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 638, 650 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
904 (1955).
15. Merchants Nat. Bank v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1952);
Van Suetendael v. Commissioner, 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945).
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of the transactions; 14 the substantiality of the transactions;17 and
the extent of advertising and sales promotion activity. 8 The
burden rests on the taxpayer to prove that the asset is a capital
asset and not one held primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business. 1
In the instant case the jury finding that the corporation was
holding the timber primarily for sale to customers in the ordi-
nary course of business was found to be fully supported by the
evidence.20 Regarding the status of the timber as a capital asset
under Section 1221 (1) of the Internal Revenue Code,21 the court,
relying upon Malat v. Riddell,22 noted that the purpose of the
section "is to differentiate between the profits and losses arising
from the everyday operation of a business on the one hand, and
the realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substan-
tial period of time.''2 8 The court further recognized that the ap-
propriate classification is a question of fact, properly resolved by
the jury. Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code,24 also relied
upon by plaintiffs, was inapplicable to the instant case, since the
corporation was no longer in the naval stores business, and few,
if any, of the trees in the disputed transaction had ever been
used in that business.
16. Williamson v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 564 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 970 (1953); Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952);
Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 714 (10th Cir. 1952).
17. Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950).
18. Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1952); Dunlap v. Old-
ham Lumber Co., 178 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1950); Shearer v. Smyth, 116 F. Supp.
230 (N.D. Cal. 1953), affd mem., 221 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1955).
. 19. Greene v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1944); D. H. Willey,
9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1109 (1950); see Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966),
holding that the asset in question must be held primarily, not merely sub-
stantially, for sale to customers and that "primarily" means "of first impor-
tance" or "principally."
20. The evidence included findings that from 1955 to 1960 the corpora-
tion had conducted site improvement efforts which resulted in the production
of a mature crop of trees; that the corporation had listed itself as a buyer
and seller of timber; that the buyer of the timber had committed itself to
continuing the reforestation program; and that all rights were to revert to
the corporation at the end of twenty years.
21. IxT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1221 provides that a capital asset includes
property held by the taxpayers whether or not connected with his trade or
business, but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer, property that
would normally be includable in his inventory at the end of the year, or
property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business.
22. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
23. Huxford v. United States, 441 F.2d 1371, 1375 (5th Cir. 1971).
24. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1231.
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Taxpayers contended that the jury should have received
more detailed instructions 25 on the subject of liquidations and
capital gains. 20 However, the court found the instant sale not
to be a liquidation in the sense of the cases cited by plaintiffs.2
The trees were not originally acquired for a purpose no longer
in existence or no longer profitable, and the corporation did not
reduce its timber holdings with the intention of eliminating alto-
gether such holdings.28
Because of inadequate tax planning, plaintiffs in the instant
case failed to convince the trier of fact that the disposition of
timber should have been regarded as the sale of a capital asset.
The importance of the decision rests in the implications raised
for the timber owner in Louisiana.29 Striving both for increased
timber sales and for preferential tax treatment on the proceeds,
he finds himself on the horns of a dilemma: to what extent may
he engage in planting, developing, and sales promotion and yet
be deemed not in the timber business for tax purposes?
25. The jury received instructions on the language of § 1221(1), which
defines capital assets, and on the distinction drawn in Malat v. R ddell. The
trial judge also instructed the jury that they might consider the following
factors: extent of development and improvement of the property; extent to
which customers were solicited; portion of the corporate income represented
by the sale; frequency and continuity of transactions; and the period of time
for which the property had been held. Finally, the judge included an instruc-
tion which was garbled in transcription, but which the court of appeals felt
was obviously taken from the opinion in White v. Commissioner, 172 F.2d 629
(5th Cir. 1949), holding that where liquidation of an asset is accompanied by
development and sales activity, the mere fact of liquidation does not pre-
clude the existence of a trade or business.
26. It was recognized that courts in certain cases have classified gains
from liquidations as capital gains where they would ordinarily be taxed as
ordinary income, on the theory that it would be unjust and unfair to tax a
party who is trying to recover only the salvage value of an asset. The term
"liquidations" is a jurisprudential concept and serves to classify what is
normally an inventory item as a capital asset when the owner of the asset
disposed of the entire inventory in a single transaction rather than in the
ordinary, day-to-day course of business.
27. Commissioner v. Williams, 256 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1958); Thomas v.
Commissioner, 254 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1958); Alabama Mineral Land Co. v.
Commissioner, 250 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1957); Consolidated Naval Stores Co. v.
Fahs, 227 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1955).
28. The contract by which the corporation sold its timber included a
clause requiring the buyer of the timber to continue the corporation's pro-
gram of planting and site improvement. The court observed that the cor-
poration would have another mature stand of trees in twenty years, thus
indicating the corporation was not reducing its holdings of trees.
29. For an illustration of the value of the forest industry to the Louisi-
ana economy see BUREAU OF THE) CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T O COMMERCE,
COUNTY BUSINESS PATTERNS--LoUISIANA 13 (1970); LOUISIANA FORESTY COMM'N,
1971 TIMBER AND PULPWOOD PRODUCTION IN LOUISIANA (1972).
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To qualify timber as a capital asset under Section 1221 (1),
proper records are essential in carrying the taxpayer's burden
of proof. Thus, one who holds timber as an investment asset
should explicitly record upon its acquisition that the timber is
not being procured, nor will it be held, for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business. All records and accounts on the
timber tract should be kept separate from those of his primary
occupation.80 In addition, he should avoid advertisements, solici-
tation, or other sales promotion activities which suggest that he
is in the timber or tree farming business.81
Due to the facts of his particular situation, the taxpayer may
unavoidably be in the trade or business of tree farming for tax
purposes and therefore outside the scope of Section 1221 (1). In
such case, capital gains treatment is available from two addi-
tional sources. First, under the provisions of Section 631 (a) of
the Internal Revenue Code, the taxpayer who cuts his own tim-
ber may elect to treat the cutting as a sale or exchange. Gain
is recognized to the extent of the difference between the deple-
tion basis32 of the timber and its fair market value at the time
of the cutting. That amount is then accorded capital gains treat-
ment under Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code, even
though the timber might otherwise be classified as held primar-
ily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.8m
30. See 4 RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA TAX COORDINATOR, § 1-4100 (1972).
Of course the taxpayer should realize that the substance of his transactions
and activities, rather than their form, will govern for tax purposes. Proper
recordation alone is not determinative, as it only reflects one fact of several
from which his tax liability will be determined. Thus, one who purchases
timber recording that the timber Is being procured for investment pur-
poses and then embarks on a program of extensive improvements and sales
activity concerning the timber could find that he Is in the timber business
for tax purposes, in spite of his recordation.
31. The taxpayer wishing to avail himself of capital asset status under
§ 1221 should avoid participation in the "tree farm" system of the American
Forestry Institute (operated In Louisiana by the Louisiana Forestry Associ-
ation), whose members display characteristic green and white signs. Because
the purpose of this program Is to encourage forest management for profit-
able timber production, participation would be strong evidence that the
owner is in the timber business.
32. See Treas. Reg. § 1.611-3 (1960) for a discussion of timber depletion
and depletion basis.
33. INT. Rsv. CODE of 1954, §§ 631(a), 1231(a), (b) (1)-(2); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.631-1 (1957); S. REP. No. 627, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1943), which indi-
cates a desire to eliminate discrimination against taxpayers who dispose of
timber by cutting as compared to those who sell it outright. Formerly, the
taxpayer who cut his timber lost the benefit of the capital gain rate which
was available when the timber was sold outright; but see Wineberg v. Com-
missioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963), which appears to hold that the elec-
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Second, the taxpayer, if he is the timber owner, may qualify for
capital gains treatment on dispositions whereby he retains an
economic interest in the timber. Section 631 (b) treats as a gain
the difference between the adjusted depletion basis of the timber
and the amount realized upon a disposal under any type of con-
tract by which the owner retains an economic interest in the
timber. Such gain would then also fall under the provisions of
Section 1231.84 In the usual case involving Section 631 (b), the
basic issue is whether an economic interest has been retained by
the taxpayer.85 If the taxpayer can show retention of such an
interest, it makes no difference that the timber was held pri-
marily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.36
George H. Robinson, Jr.
tion is unavailable to dealers holding the timber primarily for sale to cus-
tomers In the ordinary course of business.
34. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1231.
35. Compare Barclay v. United States, 333 F.2d 847 (Ct. Cl. 1964); Boeing
v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 581 (Ct. Cl. 1951); L.D. Wilson, 26 T.C. 474
(1956) (holding that an economic interest had been retained) with Ah Pah
Redwood Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957); Estate of Law-
ton, 33 T.C. 47 (1959); George L. Jantzer, 32 T.C. 161 (1959); Rev. Rul. 82,
1962-1 CUM. BULL. 155 (holding that no disposal had been made wherein an
economic interest had been retained).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-2 (1957); Ah Pah Redwood Co. v. Commissioner,
251 F.2d 163 (9th Cir. 1957); Rev. Rul. 90, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 199.
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